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This article will discuss the operation of two portions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) on mortgage foreclosure law.1  Article 3 of the 
U.C.C. governs negotiable instruments, whereas Article 9 governs secured 
transactions.  For decades, courts have utilized Article 3 to determine the 
rights of lenders and their assigns to enforce mortgage promissory notes and 
to foreclose mortgages thereon.  However, certain jurisdictions do not utilize 
the U.C.C. in foreclosure cases, whereas other jurisdictions have recently 
                                                           
* Mr. Weinstein is a Senior Attorney at Van Ness Law Firm, PLC, in Miami, Florida. He 
received his law degree from the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida and his 
undergraduate degree from the University of Florida. 
1 The interplay between state law and the U.C.C. is important in the context of mortgage 
foreclosures, because foreclosures are governed by local real property laws, but are variously 
contextualized by state versions of the Code. Am. Law Inst., Report of the Permanent Editorial 
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code: Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to 
Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes 1 (2011). 
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begun to look to Article 9 instead.2  This article argues that the Uniform 
Commercial Code should receive more uniform application, with Article 3 as 
the enforcement tool of the land. 
It can hardly be overstated that the current backlog of foreclosure cases is 
and has been stalling the housing recovery, causing ripple effects throughout 
the economy.3  In general, states operate within one or two superstructures, 
so far as the foreclosure process is concerned.  Foreclosure of a mortgage can 
either be a judicial process or a non-judicial process, and roughly half of the 
states operate in each of these frameworks.4  The process of judicial 
foreclosure is a costly and lengthy means to effectuate a foreclosure sale.5  
While there is little uniformity between states in terms of foreclosure laws, 
the law of negotiable instruments exists in forty-nine states, and presents 
potentially uniform rules aiding the prosecution of plaintiffs’ attempts to 
enforce notes and foreclose mortgages.6  
An extended and uncertain foreclosure system causes various problems.  
Lengthening the foreclosure process may cause opportunistic borrowers to 
become more likely to engage in strategic default, which creates a cycle of 
foreclosures by furthering the backlog of foreclosure cases, thus increasing 
the time to resolve any given foreclosure case, further emboldening would-be 
strategic defaulters.7  Moreover, lengthy foreclosure processes increase the 
likelihood that a code violation will occur or that an absentee owner may take 
tenants’ rent payments without dutifully meeting the burden of investing in 
                                                           
2 See generally Elizabeth Renuart, Uneasy Intersections: The Right to Foreclose and the 
U.C.C., 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1205, 1241–50 (2013).  
3 Helen Mason, No One Saw It Coming – Again Systemic Risk and State Foreclosure 
Proceedings: Why a National Uniform Foreclosure Law is Necessary, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
41, 47–49 (2012) (indicating that clearing foreclosure inefficiencies would aid the housing 
recovery).  As of 2012, “[h]istorically high levels of mortgage defaults continue to overwhelm 
the foreclosure system.”  Alan M. White, Losing the Paper – Mortgage Assignments, Note 
Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 469 (2012).  Although 
the number of properties with foreclosure filings fell to 1,117,426 in 2014, that amount is still 
approximately 156% of the number of filings during 2006.  See 1.1 Million U.S. Properties 
with Foreclosure Filings in 2014, Down 18 Percent from 2013 to Lowest Level Since 2006, 
REALTYTRAC (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-
report/11-million-us-properties-with-foreclosure-filings-in-2014-down-18-percent-from-2013-
to-lowest-level-since-2006-8205.  Additionally, “a recent surge in foreclosure starts and 
scheduled foreclosure auctions in several states in the last few months of 2014 indicate that 
lenders are gearing up for a spring cleaning of deferred distress in the first half of 2015 in 
some local markets.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 3.4 (1997). 
5 Mason, supra note 3, at 47–49. 
6 Id. at 53. 
7 Id. at 69–70.  This problem also carries with it the risk that lenders will be less willing to 
engage in workout options with individuals who are acting in good faith. 




building upkeep.8  These problems combine to slow or prevent a full 
recovery from occurring. 
As will be discussed, infra, the concept of “negotiability,” namely that 
parties should be able to affect the transfer of certain instruments by a 
transfer of possession, provides a predictable and largely complete 
framework for determining a party’s right to enforce an instrument such as a 
promissory note.9  Negotiable notes are involved in many judicial foreclosure 
proceedings, and the negotiability of such notes facilitates the determination 
of the parties’ rights.  
Some states and courts do not use the U.C.C. in determining who is 
entitled to enforce a mortgage note.10  In other states, there have been recent 
attempts to forego determining who is entitled to enforce a note by way of its 
negotiability and to, instead, apply portions of the U.C.C. that deal with 
secured transactions.11  These changes largely began after the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the “National 
Conference”) adopted amendments to Article 9 of the U.C.C., initially for the 
purpose of facilitating the securitization of mortgages.12  Recently, in HSBC 
Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez,13 a court determined the priority of two would-be 
possessors of fraudulent notes and mortgages for the same property by 
looking to the State’s codification of Article 9.14  It is against this backdrop 
that the history and future of mortgage note negotiability should be 
discussed. 
Parts I-III of this Article will discuss the negotiable nature of mortgage 
notes, and the significance of this character.  Part I will briefly discuss the 
importance of a plaintiff’s standing to initiate and pursue foreclosure.  Part II 
                                                           
8 Steven T. Hasty, Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure by Funding Needed Repairs, 20 J. L. & 
POL’Y 581, 594 (2012). 
9 Report of the Editorial Board, supra note 1, at 4.  The “complete set of rules” provided in 
Article 3 is generally only contingent upon the instrument overcoming one entry barrier to 
enforcement: “If the mortgage note is a negotiable instrument” then Article 3 will be able to 
help parties and the courts determine who may enforce obligations and to whom obligations 
are owed.  Id. 
10 See Renuart, supra note 2, at 1249–50.  
11 See generally Thomas Erskine Ice, Negotiating the American Dream: A Critical Look at the 
Role of Negotiability in the Foreclosure Crisis, 86 FLA. B.J. 8 (Dec. 2012); Matthew D. 
Weidner & Michael Fulchino, Foreclosing in a Hurricane: Florida Courts Struggle to Deal 
with a Crisis of Epic Proportions, 41 STETSON L. REV. 679 (2012); White, supra note 3, at 
473. 
12 Renuart, supra note 2, at 1206 (stating that easing securitization protocols was a “driving 
force” in the subject amendments to the U.C.C. and noting that the amendments extend 
coverage to the sale of promissory notes, declare that the sale of a note constitutes a sale of the 
mortgage, and provide for automatic perfection of “interests in both the note and the 
accompanying mortgage without the need to file”).   
13 165 So. 3d 696 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 2015). 
14 As will be discussed, infra, the court in Perez relies upon a case, which utilized Article 3 to 
determine a similar situation, and does not explain its reason for deviating from reasoning 
under Article 3. 
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will analyze the history of both the negotiability of notes and the foreclosure 
of mortgages.  This historical analysis is meant to provide an explication of 
the divergent paths notes and mortgages have taken, in terms of the 
predictability of enforcement outcomes and the relative harshness each 
produces.  Part III will discuss the negotiable character of mortgage 
promissory notes.  If a note is a negotiable instrument, then transfer of the 
note may be analyzed under Article 3.  However, even if a note is negotiable, 
that does not mean that it is not also potentially subject to enforcement under 
Article 9. 
Part IV will provide an overview of enforcement mechanisms utilized in 
various jurisdictions.  This Part will highlight the law in jurisdictions in 
which Article 3 is applied to determine the standing of foreclosure plaintiffs.  
Following that, Part IV will review application of common law and other 
enforcement mechanisms in jurisdictions that do not look to the U.C.C. in 
determining a plaintiff’s standing to enforce a negotiable instrument and 
foreclosure the security interest secured thereby.  Finally, this Part will 
explore recent cases in which Article 9 has been applied in the foreclosure 
context. 
Part V will argue that uniform application of the U.C.C. will aid the 
recovering housing market and provide a predictable framework for 
foreclosure of mortgage, going forward.  Specifically, Part V will argue that 
the U.C.C. should be applied to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to 
foreclose and will further argue that courts should utilize Article 3 of the 
Code in making such determinations. 
 
I. STANDING AS A MAJOR INGREDIENT IN A FORECLOSURE DISPUTE 
 
At its simplest, “standing” in a lawsuit means that a party has a sufficient 
stake in a controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.15  An 
action to foreclose a mortgage requires a plaintiff to either accelerate the 
balance due on a note or await the maturity date of a note on which the 
borrower has defaulted.16  An action to foreclose a mortgage also requires the 
                                                           
15 John Dimanno, Beyond Taxpayers’ Suits: Public Interest Standing in the States, 41 CONN. 
L. REV. 639, 642 (2008) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972)).  This 
article will not discuss federal concepts, such as standing under Article 3 of the United States 
Constitution or the “prudential” limitations on standing applied to federal cases, because 
foreclosure is a state issue and standing in foreclosure cases is generally found in a state’s 
application of its own version of the U.C.C. or in state common law.  See Joseph William 
Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and 
How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 516 (2013) (arguing that one of the myriad problems 
with the system employed by banks using Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 
referred to as “MERS,” was that they “operated in the context of a national or international 
securities market, and did not focus on the fact that property law is state law”). 
16 See generally R. Wilson Freyermuth, Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the 
Rhetoric of Good Faith, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1998) (discussing the different means 
 




plaintiff to foreclose the mortgage, which is given as security for the 
repayment of the loan obligation, itemized in the note.17  A plaintiff in a 
foreclosure action has standing to maintain the suit if the plaintiff has the 
right to enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage.18 
Leading up to the 1998 amendments of the U.C.C. and continuing 
thereafter, securitization of loans had become not only a standard practice in 
mortgage banking, but had also received mixed praise for its ability provide 
liquidity to banks while reducing funding needs.19  Due to the tendency to 
transfer and/or securitize mortgage loans, a lender’s standing to enforce a 
note and foreclose mortgage has become a critical issue in the litigation 
surrounding mortgage foreclosure.20  Prior to the foreclosure crisis, the 
banking industry developed a system whereby it used the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, in its corporate form Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc., also referred to as “MERS,” to stand in for 
lenders in mortgage transactions, acting in a nominal role.21  This system 
allowed the mortgage to be placed in the name of MERS, for the benefit of 
the lender.22  Lenders and mortgage servicers then transferred mortgages 
within the MERS system, without the necessity and cost of recording 
assignments of mortgage.23  Amongst other documentation issues, the MERS 
system was highlighted for its deficiencies during the mortgage crisis.24  
Although the standing of lenders and mortgage servicers has been 
uniformly questioned since the crisis, the law surrounding standing to 
foreclose a mortgage has not been uniformly harmonized.  Different 
                                                                                                                                           
by which a mortgagee may find itself “insecure” in its security interest and thus accelerate the 
balance, be they “objective” violations, such as the failure to make payments, or “subjective” 
violations, wherein a mortgagee may “deem itself insecure,” pursuant to RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS § 8.1). 
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS § 5.4(c) (1997) (“A mortgage may be enforced 
only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage 
secures.”). 
18 Id. 
19 The European Central Bank deployed this analysis of securitization, concluding that “asset 
securitization increases banks’ liquidity while reducing banks’ funding needs in the event of 
monetary tightening.”  Yener Altunbas et al., Securitisation and the Bank Lending Channel, 
(European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 838, Dec. 2012).  Also of note was that 
securitization “allows banks to swiftly transfer part of their credit risk to the markets,” which 
feature enabled the global crisis that followed.  See id. 
20 Christopher Cifrino, Comment, Now UCC Me, Now You Don’t: The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court Ignores the UCC in Requiring Unity of Note and Mortgage for 
Foreclosure in Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 54 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPP. 99, 103–04 (2013) (discussing 
the difficulty in producing documentation that occurred in post-2007 mortgage foreclosure 
case throughout the United States).  
21 Singer, supra note 15, at 515. 
22 See id.  
23 See id. at 515–16. 
24 Id. at 517–18. 
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jurisdictions have developed different rules on the issue, and the law on this 
subject is still developing, years later.25 
 
II. THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABILITY AND THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS 
  
In the context of the negotiability of mortgage notes, the historical 
framework of negotiability should be analyzed alongside the historical 
development of the law relating to foreclosure.  The law of negotiability 
developed as a fine-tuning process to enable the smooth function of 
commerce,26 while the law of foreclosure developed around a power struggle 
between borrowers and lenders.  From a historical vantage point, it makes 
sense to apply the collaboratively developed, and ultimately codified, rules of 
negotiability to the haphazard laws of mortgage foreclosure, which were 
cobbled together in a piecemeal, adversarial process that had no overarching 
vision or goal.   
Initially, during the sixteenth century, bills of exchange, which would 
become the principal means of negotiation, were little used.27  At the same 
time during England’s feudal period, real property transfers in England were 
occasioned by the conveyance of an absolute deed from a borrower to a 
lender, giving the lender the enormous power of being able to decline to 
convey the deed upon the borrower’s failure to fulfill any term of the 
agreement between the parties.28   
The concept of negotiability arose in Europe, largely during the 
seventeenth century, because merchants required a method to pay for goods.29  
The early process for negotiating an instrument was a cumbersome four-
party exchange.30  While the concept of negotiability was just developing, the 
                                                           
25 For example, and as further discussed infra, the principle point of this article turns on the 
lack of uniformity in the baseline decision of whether standing in a foreclosure action is 
grounded in the Uniform Commercial Code and, if so, in which section. 
26 American Securitization Forum, Transfer and Assignment of Residential Mortgage Loans in 
the Secondary Mortgage Market 3, 9–10 (2010), 
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_White_Paper_11_16_10.pdf. 
27 Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form Over Intent in 
Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 363, 377 (2002).  Even then, such bills 
could have been described as arcane. 
28 Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift from Power to Process: A Functional Approach to 
Foreclosure Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 89 (1996). As can be imagined, this scheme left 
borrowers without much, if any, recourse. 
29 Ice, supra note 9; Eggert, supra note 27, at 377. 
30 Eggert, supra note 27, at 378.  This four-party exchange would involve: (1) the maker of the 
bill; (2) the intended recipient of the funds; (3) a “drawer”; and (4) a “drawee.”  A drawer 
would draw a bill for the amount that the maker intended to pay to the intended recipient. The 
bill was, in effect, an instruction for the drawee to pay the recipient.  The drawee would 
ultimately—and inefficiently—pay the sum.  Eventually, and often through a course of 
dealings, the drawee and drawer would settle their debts. 




use of bills of exchange remained fairly limited.31  During this period, 
English real property common law developed the “equity of redemption,” 
which swung power to borrowers by providing a right to redeem property by 
paying any outstanding indebtedness within a “reasonable period.”32  The 
equity of redemption caused manifest uncertainty in lenders, which led to 
attempts by lenders to force borrowers to limit or waive the equity.33  Though 
courts initially struck down the lenders’ attempts and claimed that lenders 
were clogging the court system, lenders eventually persuaded the courts that 
the “reasonable period” was too nebulous, and the courts began to require 
that the equity be exercised within a specific timeframe, resulting in a 
process of “strict foreclosure.”34  In cases of strict foreclosure, foreclosure of 
the property interest did not extinguish a borrower’s underlying debt.35 
Over time, the use of bills of exchange expanded, and so did the scope of 
their use.36  Early limitations on negotiability were eliminated, and negotiable 
instruments became more widely used and understood.37  Moreover, the 
process of negotiability became streamlined, as instruments could now be 
negotiated by a three-party or two-party exchange.38  While the process 
surrounding negotiable instruments was being fine-tuned, early American 
jurisprudence regarding foreclosure was beginning to develop, finding its 
origins in the English common law.39  Early American courts viewed the 
concept of strict foreclosure as unduly harsh and modified the foreclosure 
process to include a public sale so that all, or at least a portion, of the 
                                                           
31 Id. at 380.  A limited scope of use for bills of exchange appears to have been the 
contemplated objective at the time, as they primarily concerned merchants dealing with 
foreign trade.  Limiting who could use bills of exchange, and with whom they could be used, 
would have prevented common merchants from having to navigate a set of complex and 
unfamiliar rules. 
32 Mattingly, supra note 28, at 89.  The “reasonable period” was itself undefined and largely 
open to varying interpretations.  
33 Id. at 90. 
34 Id. at 90–91. 
35 Id.  
36 Eggert, supra note 27, at 380–81.  This expansion began due to a bleeding of the definition 
of who was a “merchant,” within the meaning of trade practices.  The courts began to hold that 
parties using bills intended to be treated as merchants, thus creating a tautology whereby only 
merchants may use bills of exchange, but the limitation on merchants is practically delimited 
to anybody who uses such a bill.  However, over time, the merchant limitation was eliminated 
altogether. 
37 Id. at 381. 
38 Id. at 381–82.  A three-party exchange could involve the maker drawing the bill on the 
maker, eliminating the need for a drawer.  This exchange made it easier for makers and 
intended recipients of funds to interact; however, in the event that the maker does not have a 
course of dealings with the drawee, then it would have likely been more inconvenient for the 
drawee to settle a single debt with numerous makers than it would have been to settle 
numerous debts with a single drawer. 
39 Mattingly, supra note 28, at 91. 
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underlying indebtedness could be satisfied, and the borrower would not lose 
the property and remain liable for the total debt.40  
The foreclosure process splintered between states around whether the 
foreclosure process should be a judicial action: some states now use a non-
judicial process with limited rights for borrowers, while other states will only 
permit a foreclosure sale to occur after a lengthy lawsuit, in which borrowers 
are entitled to full due-process rights and safeguards.41  The process of 
foreclosure in judicial states thus productively provides access to the courts 
and other dispute-resolution mechanisms for borrowers, but is comparatively 
cumbersome and onerous, and can take years.42  
Eventually, negotiability was codified in the Uniform Commercial Code, 
specifically in Article 3.  Codification provided three measurable benefits: it 
relieved courts, attorneys, bankers, and merchants from having to learn and 
apply multiple conflicting sets of law; it promoted the application of 
harmonized amendments to the rules governing negotiable instruments; and 
it further increased the negotiability of instruments, freeing them from local 
impediments hindering their negotiability.43  The process of negotiability 
thus democratized and developed from an arcane set of principals used by 
few people in a limited set of circumstances as a substitute for money into a 
robust, uniform process for use in various settings and available to just about 
anybody.  The concept of negotiability has already expanded from its initial 
limited application as a private currency for merchants, and its function 
within the mortgage foreclosure process brings predictability and uniformity 
to an otherwise chaotic and unwieldy process.44 
 
III. NEGOTIABILITY OF MORTGAGE PROMISSORY NOTES 
 
A. Mortgage Promissory Notes as Negotiable Instruments 
 
Typically, mortgage promissory notes are negotiable instruments.45  
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a negotiable instrument is defined as 
follows:  
 
                                                           
40 Id. 
41 See id. at 92. 
42 Id. at 93 (providing that “a nonjudicial foreclosure skirts the court system”). 
43 Eggert, supra note 27, at 408–09 (stating that parties were also freed from “latent” 
impediments to negotiability, such as, perhaps, claims that mortgage notes in national 
circulation are not negotiable under a particular state’s interpretation).  
44 See Renuart, supra note 2, at 1207 (stating that, in the context of non-uniform application of 
the U.C.C., “[t]he possibility of unnecessarily inconsistent outcomes is real and harmful to the 
homeowners, litigants, and the integrity of the legal system”). 
45 The prevailing view with regard to the negotiability of mortgage notes is that “most 
mortgage notes are negotiable instrument governed by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.”  Singer, supra note 15, at 526. 




[A]n unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount 
of money, with or without interest or other charges described 
in the promise or order, if it:  
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or 
first comes into possession of a holder;  
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and  
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the 
person promising or ordering payment to do any act in 
addition to the payment of money, but the promise or 
order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, 
maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an 
authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment 
or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of 
the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or 
protection of an obligor.46 
 
To be negotiable, a promissory note should be free from contingencies and 
memoranda that would control it.47  However, a promissory note may 
nevertheless reference an additional document, such as a mortgage that 
secures the debt.48 
Most courts accept that mortgage notes are negotiable instruments, and 
apply their state’s version of Article 3.49  Questions may arise concerning the 
certainty and unconditionality of mortgage promissory notes.50  However, 
promises in promissory notes are presumed to be unconditional.51  Moreover, 
a promissory note is not made conditional simply by reference to a mortgage 
                                                           
46 U.C.C. § 3-104 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
47 Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (Pa. 1846) (holding that a note which is not free some such 
contingencies or which contains “a memorandum” which controls “it, though endorsed on it, 
would be incorporated with it and would destroy it” is not a “courier without luggage” and is 
thus non-negotiable).  The mere recital of the existence of a separate agreement, such as a 
mortgage, does not eviscerate the negotiability of the reciting note.  Robert T. Tobin, 
Negotiable Instruments — Due Date of Notice — Effect of Acceleration Clause in Mortgage 
— Poultrymen’s Service Corp. v. Brown, 4 B.C. LAW REV. 772 (1963). 
48 U.C.C. § 3-106, cmt.1. 
49 White, supra note 3, at 473 (citing a case from Massachusetts and Dale Whitman, How 
Negotiability Has Fouled up the Secondary Mortgage Market, and What to Do About It, 37 
PEPP. L. REV. 2 (2010), which surveyed “cases that either address negotiability or assume 
mortgage notes are negotiable”).  White asserts “some provisions of U.C.C. Article 9 arguably 
permit proof of a mortgage note transfer without endorsement and delivery, by proving the 
existence of a separate written agreement to sell the note.”  Id. at 474. However, such a 
circumstance, arguable as it is, would nonetheless only apply in a vacuum created by a failure 
to negotiate the note, meaning that Article 3 could never have been the determinant, to begin 
with. 
50 See GMAC v. Honest Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 933 So. 2d 34, 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006) (expressing that a negotiable instrument should be “simple, certain, unconditional, 
and subject to no contingencies.”). 
51 See U.C.C. § 3-106(a) (providing that “a promise or order is unconditional unless . . .”).  
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or its terms.52  Article 3 specifically contemplates that the express 
incorporation into a promissory note of an external set of promises does not 
affect the negotiability of the note; instead, a negotiable note which refers to 
a mortgage that contains non-negotiable terms, and which states that the note 
is made in consideration for the mortgage, is negotiable because any 
executory promise contained in the mortgage is merely a permissible, 
implied condition in the note.53  Finally, Section 3-106 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code provides that mortgage promissory notes are negotiable, 
inasmuch as “[m]any notes issued in commercial transactions are secured by 
collateral, are subject to acceleration in the event of default, or are subject to 
prepayment. . . . In some cases it may be convenient not to include a 
statement concerning collateral, prepayment, or acceleration . . . , but rather 
to refer to an accompanying loan agreement, security agreement, or mortgage 
for that statement.”54  Consequently, mortgage promissory notes are nearly 
per se negotiable. 
It bears noting that the U.C.C. contemplates that Article 3 may be 
applied to determine enforceability of an instrument that is not negotiable.  
The Official Comment 2 to Section 3-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
expresses that courts “could not arrive at a result similar to the result that 
would follow if the writing were a negotiable instrument,” and that “it may 
be appropriate . . . for a court to apply one or more provisions of Article 3 to 
the writing by analogy.”55  Therefore, it is functionally irrelevant whether a 
particular mortgage promissory note is in fact negotiable, so long as the 
courts have expressed an interest in treating such notes as negotiable. 
 
B. Lenders’ Right to Claim Status as a “Holder” 
 
Almost as a matter of course, plaintiff lenders in foreclosure actions 
encounter defenses regarding their standing to sue or their status as a real 
party in interest.  There are many avenues to establish standing in a 
foreclosure action, and a plaintiff may be in a position to acquire standing 
through more than one means at a time.56  Where the note at issue is a 
                                                           
52 See U.C.C. § 3-106(b) (providing that “[a] promise or order is not made conditional . . . by a 
reference to another record for a statement of rights with respect to collateral, prepayment or 
acceleration”); see also American Securitization Forum, supra note 26, at 10. 
53 See U.C.C. § 3-106, cmt.1. 
54 Id. 
55 U.C.C. § 3-104, cmt. 2; see also Fred H. Miller & Alvin C. Harrell, The Law of Modern 
Payment Systems § 1.03[1][b] (2003).  
56 See McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 79 So. 3d 170, 172–73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012) (holding that standing may be established by any of the following: (a) a mortgage 
assignment or equitable transfer prior to the filing of the complaint; (b) plaintiff’s status as a 
holder; (c) a special endorsement in favor of plaintiff or a blank endorsement; (d) an 
assignment from the payee to the plaintiff or an affidavit of ownership to prove plaintiff’s 
status as a holder of the note; (e) mere delivery of a note and mortgage, with intent to pass 
title; or (f) filing the original note with a special endorsement in favor of plaintiff).  McLean 
 




negotiable instrument, a lender may establish standing as either a “holder in 
due course” or merely as a “holder.”  The decision to establish standing as a 
holder is both beneficial and disadvantageous to a lender. 
Negotiability presents the possibility of a transferee taking a position that 
is better than the transferor.57  The Uniform Commercial Code defines a 
number of different possible parties to a negotiation.  There are three general 
positions that a transferee can occupy in a transfer under a negotiable 
instrument: the transferee can occupy a better position, a same position, or a 
worse position, with each position being relative to the transferor.58  
Typically, lenders in foreclosure actions occupy the same or worse position, 
given their frequent status as a “holder,”59 rather than the better position of a 
“holder in due course.”60 
Under Article 3, a “holder in due course” occupies a privileged 
position.61  Specifically, a holder in due course is insulated from numerous 
defenses to the right to enforce an instrument.  A holder in due course is 
susceptible only to the “real defenses” of a borrower or other interested 
party.62  The real defenses include claims of infancy, essential fraud, 
insolvency, duress, incapacity, or illegality.63  Though there is an assumption 
of good faith in Article 3 dealings,64 a holder in due course is still protected 
from many defenses to the right to enforce. 
                                                                                                                                           
has been cited in sixty cases since 2012, including multiple federal cases, and state cases in 
Kansas, New Hampshire, Ohio, and South Dakota.  The pertinent analysis has been distilled 
into a tighter framework, in which a plaintiff in a foreclosure case who is not the original 
lender “may establish standing . . . by submitting a note with a blank or special indorsement, 
an assignment of the note, or an affidavit otherwise proving his status as holder of the note.”  
Pennington v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 151 So. 3d 52, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
57 Curtis Nyquist, A Spectrum Theory of Negotiability, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 897, 907–08 (1995) 
(calling negotiability “a fundamental and indispensable way of thinking about transfers of 
property”). 
58 Id. at 904. 
59 Id. at 953 (explaining that a holder who fails to comply with the strictures of Article 3 takes 
a note in a worse position, whereas a holder who fully complies may take a same position). 
60 A holder in due course is a holder, where there is an absence of apparent evidence of 
forgery, alteration, or irregularity at the time of issuance or negotiation, and where the 
instrument is take for value, in good faith, without notice of the instrument being overdue, 
dishonored, or in default, without notice of an unauthorized signature or alteration, without 
notice of a claim to the instrument, and without notice of a defense or claim in recoupment.  
U.C.C. § 3-302(a).  Contrast this with that of a holder, who is merely “the person in possession 
of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the 
person in possession.”  U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A).  The position of a holder in due course, 
while providing protection from certain defenses, is more difficult to claim and obtain, and 
thus less frequently used in a typical foreclosure dispute. 
61 Nyquist, supra note 57, at 904 (arguing that holder in due course status represents the 
“archetypal ‘better than’ position”). 
62 Id. at 928–29. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 929. 
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Alternatively, a “holder” is merely “the person in possession of a 
negotiable instrument that is [made] payable to bearer or to an identified 
person that is the person in possession.”65  By claiming to simply be a holder, 
rather than a holder in due course, foreclosure plaintiffs are not subjected to 
certain questions about actual ownership of notes and mortgages.66  
However, status as a holder leaves lenders open to defenses from which 
holders in due course would be shielded, and, additionally, opens up the 
possibility for counterclaims, such as claims arising under the Federal Truth 
in Lending Act or other federal or state statutes.67  Pleading as a holder, 
therefore, entitles a lender to certain evidentiary privileges—while balancing 
those privileges with added rights and defenses for borrowers and third 
parties. 
 
C. The Thief’s “Right” to Enforce a Note 
 
In a technical sense, a note holder may be a “thief,” inasmuch as the 
holder may be in wrongful possession of the note and may not actually own 
the note.68  Section 3-301 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that 
“[a] person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though 
the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of 
the instrument.”69  Therefore, a close reading of Section 3-301 may lead to 
the assumption that a thief will be duly authorized to enforce mortgage 
promissory notes in open court.70  However, such a reading is at odds with 
the reality of mortgage promissory note enforcement.  Two principles of 
negotiable instrument enforcement contribute to solve the anomaly of a 
thief’s enforcement: the authorization principle and the negligence 
principle.71  Additionally, the right to enforce lost or stolen instruments 
generally prevents thieves from enforcing mortgage promissory notes.72 
The enforcement of instruments is governed in part by the authorization 
principle, which may be stated either by the maxim “authorization imposes 
                                                           
65 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A); see also Weidner and Fulchino, supra note 11, at 683–84; 
Timothy R. Zinnecker, Extending Enforcement Rights to Assignees of Lost, Destroyed, or 
Stolen Negotiable Instruments Under U.C.C. Article 3: A Proposal for Reform, 50 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 111, 113 (2001); American Securitization Forum, supra note 26, at 12 (noting that, while 
the term “possession” is not defined in the U.C.C., it is generally permissible for a holder to 
constructively possess a note). 
66 Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, Transparency, 
and Accuracy in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 551, 562 (2011). 
67 Id. 
68 Ice, supra note 11, at 11–12. 
69 U.C.C. § 3-301. 
70 See id. 
71 L. Ali Khan, A Theoretical Analysis of Payment Systems, 60 S.C. L. REV. 425, passim 
(2008). 
72 Zinnecker, supra note 65, 131–32. 




liability” or, alternatively, by the aphorism “no authorization; no liability.”73  
In essence, the person who authorizes a negotiation is liable for the 
negotiation.  The authorization principle serves the function of equity,74 
purposefully overlooking forged or missing endorsements to achieve the end 
of inquiring whether the payment is made to the intended payee.75  In 
practice, the authorization principle resolves whether a thief may enforce a 
mortgage promissory note: it is unlikely that a court will allow a thief to both 
steal an instrument and subsequently argue that said thief is entitled to 
enforce the instrument as that would force the obligor, as a matter of law, to 
pay the instrument.76 
Moreover, in the unlikely event that the thief is entitled to enforce a 
mortgage promissory note, Article 3 provides for a just allocation of loss.  
The depository bank that the thief deals with will ultimately bear the loss, 
because the thief will be unlikely to reimburse the bank.77  This theory of loss 
is acceptable under Article 3 because the one who deals with the wrongdoer 
must suffer the loss.78  Effectively, the depository bank is charged with 
ensuring that it is not allowing a thief to profit.79  
In addition to the authorization principle, the negligence principle 
provides for equitable allocation of loss in the unlikely event that a thief is 
able to effectively enforce a mortgage promissory note.  A party whose 
negligence contributes substantially to the alteration or forgery of an 
instrument is held liable.80  The negligence principle, which is robustly 
applied to negotiable instruments, simply requires persons to use care when 
issuing, transferring, debiting, and crediting payment orders.81 
Finally, the right to enforce lost or stolen instruments prevents thieves 
from enforcing mortgage promissory notes.  Under Section 3-301(iii), a 
former holder may enforce a lost, stolen, or destroyed instrument.82  The 
purpose of this enforcement right as to stolen instruments is to take the 
“criminal mind” into account and to prevent the inequity of a thief being 
entitled to enforce a note.83  Article 3 has multiple, redundant safeguards to 
prevent the enforcement of a mortgage promissory note by a thief, 
notwithstanding the fact that such enforcement is technically possible. 
                                                           
73 Khan, supra note 71, at 434.  
74 Equity is important in these disputes, because foreclosure is generally an equitable remedy, 
rather than a remedy at law.  See Andrew J. Kazakes, Developments in the Law: Protecting 
Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage 
Modification, and State Court Responses, 43 LOY. L. REV. 1383, 1393 (2010). 
75 Khan, supra note 71, at 444. 
76 Id. at 445–46. 
77 See id. at 447–48. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (providing that the theory is consistent with international negotiable instrument law). 
80 Id. at 458. 
81 Khan, supra note 71, at 458–59  
82 U.C.C. § 3-301(iii) (2002). 
83 Zinnecker, supra note 65, at 131–32. 
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D. Plaintiff Holder’s Right to Foreclose the Mortgage 
 
As the holder of a mortgage promissory note, a lender plaintiff is entitled 
to enforce the mortgage securing the note.  A genesis of cases following 
reasoning akin to that found in Johns v. Gillian holds that a note-holder is 
entitled to enforce a mortgage because the mortgage follows the note.84  The 
holding that the mortgage follows the note facilitates the secondary mortgage 
market, and is so universal that every state except for Minnesota follows it.85  
There has been recent pushback against the concept that the mortgage 
follows the note, in which borrowers have attempted to argue that Johns has 
been misapplied in case law for almost one hundred years, and therefore 
should entitle only the owner to enforce the mortgage, rather than the 
holder.86  The attack generally centers on the factual circumstances in Johns, 
and applies those facts to all cases claiming that the mortgage follows the 
note.87  However, it is generally understood that a note-holder may foreclose 
a mortgage, and a plaintiff need only establish entitlement to enforce the note 
in order to demonstrate its ability to foreclose the incidental mortgage; such a 
plaintiff need not demonstrate ownership of the note.88  
 
IV. APPLICATION IN VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS:  
THE TREND TOWARD ENFORCEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 9 
 
Prior to amendment, Article 9 of the U.C.C. governed only conventional 
security interests in personal property.89  The reach of Article 9 was 
expanded by amendments in 1972 and, subsequently, in 1998.90 Based on the 
1998 amendments and state legislation adopted thereafter, there are recent 
attempts to forego determining who is entitled to enforce a note by way of its 
negotiability and instead to apply portions of the U.C.C. that deal with 
secured transactions as opposed to negotiable instruments.91  These attempts 
may have begun with the Massachusetts case U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, in 
which a promissory note was prosecuted as though it had been given in the 
                                                           
84 Johns v. Gillian, 184 So. 140 (Fla. 1938). 
85 Ann M. Burkhart, Third Party Defenses to Mortgages, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1003, 1012–13 
(1998) (providing that “courts in all but one state hold that a negotiable instrument imparts its 
quality of negotiability to the mortgage”). 
86 Ice, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 36–39; Weidner and Fulchino, supra note 11, at passim. 
87 Ice, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 36–39; Weidner and Fulchino, supra note 11, at passim. 
88 See Chris Markus, Ron Taylor & Blake Vogt, From Main Street to Wall Street: Mortgage 
Loan Securitization and New Challenges Facing Foreclosure Plaintiffs in Kentucky, 36 N. KY. 
L. REV. 395, 406–07 (2009). 
89 Renuart, supra note 2, at 1224 (discussing the original drafting of Article 9). 
90 Id. 
91 Ice, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 36–39; Weidner and Fulchino, supra note 11, at passim; White, 
supra note 32, at 473 (2012). 




context of a sale according to non-U.C.C. state law.92  Recently, in HSBC 
Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez, a Florida court applied Article 9 to determine who 
was entitled to enforce a mortgage in a dispute between two entities claiming 
to have received a first mortgage for the same property from the same 
borrower. 93  
The Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. identified four rules with 
regard to enforcement of mortgage promissory notes and mortgages.94  First, 
Article 3 determines who is entitled to enforce a negotiable note.95  Second, 
Article 9 determines whether a property right attaches to a transferee of a 
note.96  Third, Article 9 provides an attached property right in the mortgage 
to a transferee with an attached property right in a note.97  Fourth, Article 9 
enables an owner of a note and mortgage to record its interest for the purpose 
of seeking remedies in non-judicial states.98  However, each of the 
aforementioned Article 9 rules appears to apply more easily in the context of 
non-judicial foreclosure states, because in a judicial state the rules would 
appear to conflict with Article 3 determinations of entitlement to enforce a 
negotiable note.  Moreover, the U.C.C. is not adopted in the same manner in 
each state, and each state’s case law applies different reasoning with regard 
to their individual statutory schemes.  
This section will discuss this trend, with focus on development in eleven 
states, to wit: California, Tennessee, Arizona, South Carolina, Indiana, 
Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois, Colorado, New York, and Florida.99 In 
federal or state courts in certain jurisdictions, borrowers have attempted to 
argue that Article 9 governs any determinations that the court would make, 
and have been rebuffed.  In at least one state, the courts have decided that the 
U.C.C. is per se inapplicable to mortgage foreclosures.  In other jurisdictions, 
there is an apparent tilt toward the application of Article 9 to determine who 
is entitled to enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage.  This section will 
focus first on jurisdictions that apply Article 3, then on jurisdictions that do 
not look to the U.C.C. to determine who may foreclose a mortgage, and 
finally to jurisdictions in which Article 9 is being utilized. 
                                                           
92 U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 941 N.E. 2d 40 (Mass. 2011). 
93 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez, 165 So. 3d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
94 See Renuart, supra note 2, at 1241. 




99 A comprehensive list of where states stood on this issue, as of 2013, is detailed in the article 
Uneasy Intersections: The Right to Foreclose and the U.C.C.  See Renuart, supra note 2, at 
1243–50.  However, the ground appears to have shifted since then, with either state or federal 
opinions in a number of jurisdictions clarifying the states’ application of the U.C.C. or 
reversing course on this issue.  Professor Renuart determined that there are three categories of 
states, subsequent to the Article 9 revisions: states which rely on the U.C.C. to provide the 
result, states which utilize other state law and the U.C.C. to provide the result, and state which 
rely on other state law, which law may conflict with the U.C.C.  Id. at 1254.  
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A. Article 3 Jurisdictions 
 
1. California: In re Smith 
  
The U.C.C. is codified in California’s Commercial Code.100  In In re 
Smith,101 the court reviewed whether, under the Commercial Code, a 
mortgage promissory note is a negotiable instrument, along with the question 
of whether enforcement of the note should be determined by Article 3 or 
Article 9.102  
The argument in In re Smith turned on the securitization of the note—the 
borrower argued that the note was governed by Article 9 because the note 
had been transferred to a third-party pool of loans.103  The court held that 
“securitization does not change the obligation of the borrower to pay the note 
or the note holder’s right to foreclose.”104  The court reasoned that Article 3 
of the U.C.C. “pertains to negotiable instruments,” while “Article 9 governs 
the sale of most payment rights, including the sale of both negotiable and 
non-negotiable notes.”105  The court noted, however, that “the sale of a 
promissory note under Article 9 does not necessarily change the identity of 
the person entitled to enforce the note.”106  Ultimately, the court ruled that the 
note holder was entitled to enforce the note, regardless of the impact of any 
securitization of the loan.107 
 
2. Tennessee: Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Tibbs 
 
In Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Tibbs,108 plaintiff lender sought a 
declaration regarding priority and enforceability of a deed of trust lien.109  
The borrowers argued that plaintiff was required to prove ownership of the 
“mortgage loan, note and deed of trust” because the loan had been sold.110  
The borrowers further alleged that the plaintiff could not establish a right to 
enforce the note by being a holder under Article 3 of the U.C.C. because 
                                                           
100 CAL. COM. CODE, passim (West). 
101 In re Smith, 509 B.R. 260 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2014). 
102 Id. at 265. 
103 Id.  The borrower, as plaintiff in an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, argued that 
the note could not be enforced, so long as it was held in a securitized trust.  Id. 
104 Id.  The latter half of this holding, that the holder’s right to foreclose is unaffected by 
securitization, places this case in a seemingly-eroding framework, as discussed, infra. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 In re Smith, 509 B.R. at 268–69; see also In re Nordeen, 495 B.R. 468, 479–80 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2013). 
108  No. 3:11-0763, 2014 WL 280365, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). 
109 Plaintiff alternatively sought damages for the borrowers’ purported involvement in a 
conspiracy to deprive the bank of its rights in the property.  Id. 
110 Id. at *2. 




Article 3 is inapplicable to the sale of mortgage notes.111  Instead, the 
borrowers argued that Article 9 controlled the case because the transfer of the 
mortgage and/or promissory note is within the purview of Article 9.112 
The court noted “similar arguments have been soundly rejected.”113  The 
court then reasoned that, although Article 9 applies to the sale of promissory 
notes, Article 3 provides the rules governing payments.114  Additionally, the 
court held that a holder may enforce a note that has been sold, even if the 
holder is not the owner of the note.115  Tibbs, therefore, seems to place 
Tennessee into states utilizing Article 3 for purposes of determining the right 
to enforce sold or securitized mortgage notes.116 
 
3. Arizona: In re Tarantola 
 
Arizona follows the rule that Article 3 of the U.C.C. governs the 
enforcement of mortgage notes.  In In re Tarantola,117 the sole question was 
whether a trustee of a securitized mortgage pool had standing to enforce a 
promissory note secured by a deed of trust.118  The trustee filed a motion for 
relief from the stay imposed by the bankruptcy case.119  The borrower 
responded by claiming that the trustee did not have standing to seek relief 
from the stay, which argument the court initially accepted, because the 
trustee did not demonstrate its entitlement to enforce the note due to a failure 
to “produce competent evidence of its standing because it did not provide 
critical securitization documents.”120  In the decision regarding the motion for 
relief from stay, the court found that “for Defendant to have a colorable 
claim sufficient to be granted relief from the automatic stay, Defendant had 
to either own the Note or be entitled to enforce it.”121  
                                                           
111 Id. 
112 Id.  It does not appear that the borrowers reconciled the fact that a negotiation is, itself, a 
transfer.  See U.C.C. § 3-201(a); U.C.C. § 3-203(b). 
113 Id. (citing In re Connelly, 487 B.R. 230, 240 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2013). 
114 Tibbs, No. 3:11-0763, 2014 WL 280365, at *3. 
115 Id.  The court also ruled against the borrowers on procedural grounds, for failure to 
properly preserve the issue. 
116 See id. at passim. 
117 491 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2013). 
118 Id. at 113.  In re Tarantola arises out of an adversary proceeding in a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy case.  
119 Id. at 114.   
120 Id. (indicating that the trustee also provided “conflicting versions of the Note in a series of 
submissions that was. . . frankly, inept and alarming.”). 
121 Id.  The court discussed that a showing of entitlement to enforce a note could be made by 
any of the following: (1) a demonstration that indorsements on the note were executed by 
parties with authority to act for the owners of the note at the time of each indorsement’s 
execution; (2) a demonstration that the note was properly transferred to a pool  pursuant to a 
governing pooling and servicing agreement; or (3) a demonstration that the note was 
transferred to a pool pursuant to a governing mortgage loan purchase agreement.  The first of 
these methods goes against the Article 3 presumption of validity of endorsements, and 
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Following the motion for relief from stay, the case proceeded to trial, and 
the parties submitted post-trial memoranda.122  The borrower reiterated the 
position that the note is not a negotiable instrument and that Article 9 of the 
U.C.C. provides the controlling law.123  The court determined that, because 
the trustee was the holder of the note, the trustee was entitled to enforce the 
note and foreclose the mortgage pursuant to Article 3.124  Further, the court 
specifically rejected the argument that Article 9 could provide the governing 
law for the case.125 
 
4. South Carolina: Swindler v. Swindler 
 
There are occasions where the application of Article 3 serves to prevent 
the foreclosure of a mortgage.  Swindler v. Swindler presents such an 
occasion. 126  A family brought an action to foreclose a mortgage against their 
sister-in-law, who claimed that the debt had been renounced when the 
family’s mother had given the defendant possession of the original note.127  
If Article 3 of the U.C.C. did not govern the note in Swindler then the 
note would not have been subject to renunciation by transfer of possession to 
the debtor.128  The parties did not dispute that the note was a negotiable 
instrument.129  However, the lower court found that, although the note was a 
negotiable instrument within the meaning of Article 3, it was nonetheless 
subject to the provisions of Article 9.130  The appellate court reversed, 
reasoning “nothing in Article 9 provides a limitation on the applicability to 
notes secured by mortgages on real estate.”131 
 
                                                                                                                                           
constrains the free exchange of commercial paper.  The latter two methods would require a 
plaintiff in a foreclosure dispute to offer proof of contracts or transactions to which the 
borrower would be neither a party nor a third party beneficiary. 
122 Id. at 116–18. 
123 In re Tarantola, 491 B.R. at 116–18. 
124 Id. at 118–19 (acknowledging that, even if the trustee were not a holder of the note, under 
exceptions found in Article 3, the trustee may still have had the right to foreclose as a 
nonholder in possession of the instrument). 
125 Id. at 120-21 (holding that “Plaintiff’s argument that Article 9 provides the governing law 
of this case is not meritorious”). 
126 Swindler v. Swindler, 584 S.E. 2d 438 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing a judgment of 
foreclosure). 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 441–42. 
129 Id. at 440.  
130 Id.  South Carolina’s adaptation of the U.C.C. contains a statute that provides that “[t]he 
provisions of this chapter are subject to the provisions of the chapter on . . . secured 
transactions.”  Id. 
131 Swindler, 584 S.E. 2d at 441.  The court went on to reason that, under the facts in Swindler, 
there was no conflict between any provision of Article 3 and Article 9.  Id.  The analysis in 
Swindler arguably does not apply to a situation in which a note is sold, securitized, or 
otherwise transferred to a third party. 




5. Indiana: First Valley Bank v. First Sav. and Loan Ass’n of Central 
Indiana 
 
In First Valley Bank,132 First Valley Bank was held liable in eighteen 
separate summary judgments as an endorser with recourse of mortgage 
notes.133  First Valley Bank appealed, arguing in part that mortgage notes are 
not negotiable instruments and raising issues concerning Article 9 of the 
U.C.C.134  First, the court explained that Article 3 of the U.C.C. applies to a 
promissory note secured by a mortgage.135  Rejecting the bank’s argument to 
the contrary, the court held that “mortgage notes are subject to the general 
law of negotiable instruments. . . without regard to the fact that they are 
affected with an interest in real property.”136  
Secondly, the court concluded that Article 9 did not operate as to trump 
enforcement under Article 3 with regard to mortgage promissory notes.137  
Indiana’s adaptation of the U.C.C. has a common clause regarding Articles 3 
and 9, stating that Article 3 is made subject to the provisions of Article 9.138  
However, because Article 9 does not apply “to the creation or transfer of an 
interest or lien on real estate,” the court found that Article 9 “has no 
provisions relating to mortgage of real property.”139  The court cites to a 
comment to section 9-104(j), which cites two cases dealing with a security 
interest given by a mortgagee, and concluded that both cases hold that “a 
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument takes the mortgage freed of 
personal defenses.”140  Therefore, even in a situation in which the mortgagee 
gives an Article 9 security interest to a third party in Indiana, the holder 
analysis in Article 3 controls enforcement of the note and the attendant right 
to foreclose the mortgage. 
 
B. Non-U.C.C. Jurisdictions 
 
1. Michigan: Al-Raeis v. Aurora Bank, FSB 
 
In Al-Raeis v. Aurora Bank, FSB,141 the Michigan court affirmed a 
finding that summary disposition was appropriate in a non-judicial 
                                                           
132 412 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). 
133 Id. at 1239. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1241 (holding that “[s]o far as Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code is 
concerned, a promissory note secured by a mortgage is a negotiable instrument”). 
136 Id.  
137 See id.  
138 Id. 
139 First Valley Bank, 412 N.E.2d at 1241. The court goes so far as to hold that “UCC’s 9-
104(j) silences Article 9 as to real estate mortgages.”  
140 Id. 
141 No. 3136269, 2014 WL 6953557 (Mich. App. Dec. 9, 2014). 
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foreclosure.142  The borrower brought an appeal, claiming that she had 
standing to challenge the sale.143  Challenging a Michigan statute related to 
the specific process of foreclosure by advertisement,144 the borrower alleged 
that certain assignments of mortgage were not accompanied by the 
promissory note.145  The borrower’s argument involved a claim under both 
Articles 3 and 9, averring that a party seeking to enforce or negotiate a 
promissory note must be in possession of the note.146  
The court, reasoning under Michigan statutes unrelated to an adaptation 
of the U.C.C., held that the promissory note was functionally irrelevant to an 
ability to foreclose the mortgage,147 and further found that, as a third party to 
the subject assignments of mortgage, the borrower did not have standing to 
challenge the assignments.148  Specifically, the court in Al-Raeis rejected 
application of the U.C.C. to the foreclosure of mortgages by advertisement 
wholesale, and held that a “mortgage instrument” is not a “negotiable 
instrument.”149  The court does not discuss the impact of the note having the 
                                                           
142 Id. at *1.  Michigan permits a foreclosure to occur by advertised sale, following which a 
party may move for summary disposition, provided that there is neither an allegation of fraud 
or irregularity in the sale process or a judicial determination regarding any claims prior to the 
expiration of the state’s redemption period.  See id. 
143 Id. 
144 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3204(3) (West 2014) (providing that “[i]f the party 
foreclosing a mortgage by advertisement is not the original mortgagee, a record chain of title 
must exist before the date of sale . . . evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the party 
foreclosing the mortgage”). 
145 Al-Raeis, 2014 WL 6953557 at *3. 
146 Id. Were the party to establish the right to enforce a lost note, actual possession would not 
be required.  However, the foreclosing party in the case did not allege that it was entitled to 
enforce a lost note.  As a result, that question was not a part of the borrower’s argument or the 
court’s reasoning.  
147  Id. at *3–4.  
148 Id.  The court’s announcement that a third party may not challenge assignments of a 
mortgage is a frequent refrain in foreclosure disputes, and extends in certain jurisdictions to 
other documents related to transfers of security instruments, including pooling and servicing 
agreements.  See Velasco v. Sec. Nat. Mortgage Co., 823 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (D. Haw. 
2011) aff'd, 508 F. App’x 679 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); McGill v. Impac CMB Trust 
Series 2007-A, No. 6:12-cv-1142-Orl-28TBS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112575, at *5–6 (M.D. 
Fla. July 18, 2013) (citations omitted); Coursen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 8:12-cv-690-
T-26EAJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144295, *33–34, (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2013) (citations 
omitted); Castillo v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 89 So. 3d 1069, 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012); Bank of Am. Nat. Ass’n v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C., 2012 981 N.E.2d 1, 7, ¶ 15 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2012), modified on denial of reh'g, (Dec. 7, 2012) (citations omitted).  
149 Al-Raeis, 2014 WL 6953557, at *3–4.  The language used by the court in Al-Raeis on this 
point is curious, because the reference to a “mortgage instrument” could seemingly be a 
reference to either the mortgage note or the mortgage, itself.  The citation to Mox v. Jordan 
provides some clarity, because the court in Mox was clearly discussing a mortgage: “A 
mortgage merely secures payment of the negotiable instrument.”  463 N.W.2d 114, 115 
(1990).  Although Al-Raeis appears limited to foreclosures by advertisement, “several courts 
in” the Eastern District of Michigan “have held that the U.C.C. does not apply to mortgage 
foreclosures.”  Berry v. Main St. Bank, 977 F. Supp. 2d 766, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 




property of a negotiable instrument, or whether a mortgage note is deemed to 




a. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez 
 
In U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, trustees had foreclosed on two 
properties and then purchased the properties back at the foreclosure sales.151  
The trustees filed complaints seeking a declaration that they held clear title to 
the properties.152  The court held that the trustees did not demonstrate that 
they had standing to foreclose, and therefore held that the foreclosures sales 
were not valid to convey title to the properties.153  The court invalidated the 
sales without relying on the U.C.C., and instead applied Massachusetts 
common law.154 
 
b. Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n 
 
In Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,155 the Massachusetts court analyzed 
a fact pattern in which the borrower executed a note in favor of BankUnited 
FSB and a mortgage in favor of MERS, Inc., acting as nominee for 
BankUnited FSB.156  The mortgage was assigned to Green Tree Servicing, 
LLC, which attempted to foreclose the mortgage following a default for 
failure of the borrower to make payments.157  Green Tree was the highest 
bidder at the sale and assigned its bid to Federal National Mortgage 
Association.158  
Upon the borrower’s refusal to vacate and surrender the property, 
eviction proceedings were commenced.159  The borrower filed a 
counterclaim, alleging that foreclosure should not have occurred because the 
foreclosing party was only in possession of the mortgage, and was not in 
                                                           
150 See generally Al-Raeis, 2014 WL 6953557. 
151 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Mass. 2011). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 53. 
154 Id. at 54. 
155 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1127–28 (2012).  Massachusetts is a non-judicial foreclosure state, which 
permits foreclosures to occur by a vehicle called a “power of sale.”  Following the sale of the 
property, a borrower may attempt to prevent eviction or reverse the foreclosure, by means of 
judicial process.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 21. 
156 Eaton, 969 N.E. 2d at 1121–22 (citations and footnotes omitted).  Listing MERS as a 
nominee for the lender is a typical practice, which creates a nominal interest in MERS, mainly 
permitting mortgages to be transferred within the MERS system.  Id.  This has led to problems 
related to record-keeping, which are more fully elucidated elsewhere.  See Id. at 1131–33. 
157 Id. at 1122. 
158 Id. at 1122–23. 
159 Id. at 1123. 
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possession of the note.160  Federal National Mortgage Association was 
enjoined from interfering with the property, and an appeal commenced.161  
The borrower argued on appeal that Article 3 of the U.C.C. governed the 
question of whether Green Tree had been entitled to enforce the note.162 
Rather than turn to Article 3 or Article 9 of the U.C.C., the court 
reasoned through Chapter 183 and Chapter 244 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws.163  The court arrived at the conclusion that the entity foreclosing the 
mortgage must also have the ability to enforce the note.164  Although the 
court arrived at a similar result to what would have likely occurred were it to 
have analyzed the case through the prism of Article 3, the case failed to 
create a precedential imperative to apply article 3 to mortgage foreclosures in 
Massachusetts.165 
 
3. Illinois: In re Haase 
 
In a heavily litigated bankruptcy action, the bailor of cattle, which were 
improperly sold by the debtor at a livestock auction sale, sought the proceeds 
of the sale and had priority over a bank’s claim to the subject proceeds.166  In 
In re Haase, as one of the bank’s claims to priority, the bank attempted to 
argue entitlement to priority by virtue of being a holder in due course, 
pursuant to Article 3 of the U.C.C.167  The court held that a stranger to an 
agreement which is otherwise governed by Article 3 does not have their 
rights determined by Article 3.168  
The analysis begins by noting that Article 3 applies to negotiable 
instruments and governs the rights and obligations of those who are parties to 
or are in possession of negotiable instruments.169  With regard to the 
underlying transaction, the following parties engaged in the transaction: the 
debtor who sold a non-party’s cattle through an auction, the auction that 
issued the check for the sale, and the banks that drew and deposited the 
                                                           
160 Id. 
161 Id.  
162 Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (2012) 
(No. SJC-1104), 2011 WL 4826356, at *3. 
163 Eaton, 969 N.E. 2d at passim.  The court additionally utilized reasoning from common law, 
which itself was not premised upon either of the subject articles of the U.C.C.  See id.  
164 Id. at 1132–33. 
165 In fact, it has been noted that “the court’s failure to address the UCC” goes so far as to 
obfuscate “the relationship between the UCC and foreclosures in Massachusetts.”  Cifrino, 
supra note 20, at 110. The opinion in Eaton represents a pattern in Massachusetts, because it 
was “not the first time the SJC has neglected the UCC in a mortgage context” and citing 
Ibanez as contradicting Article 9.  Id. at 110–11. 
166 In re Haase, 224 B.R. 673, 678 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998). 
167 Id.  
168 Id.  
169 Id. (citing W. Grp. Nurseries v. Pomeranz, 867 P.2d 12, 16 (Colo. App. 1993)). 




check.170  The court in In re Haase rejects the application of Article 3, for 
one sole reason: the case does not involve the four parties to the exchange, 
but instead involves the non-party—a bailor, whose bailed cattle was 
improperly sold.171 
 
C. Potential Article 9 Jurisdictions 
 
1. Colorado: Western Group Nurseries, Inc. v. Pomeranz 
 
Western Grp. Nurseries, Inc. v. Pomeranz presents a dispute related to 
notes and security agreements that does not expressly deal with mortgage 
foreclosure, but does revolve in pertinent part around whether application of 
Article 3 or Article 9 of the U.C.C. is appropriate.172  The case arose out of 
the sale of nursery stock and other assets, and the simultaneous sale of the 
subject assets by the purchaser to a third-party company, when the second 
sale involved a security agreement.173  The notes in the transactions did not 
specifically bar a suit against the limited partners of the initial seller.174  
The limited partners moved for summary judgment, claiming that 
application of Article 3 of the U.C.C. restricted their liability, due to the 
contents of the security agreements between the parties.175  The first 
purchaser filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking application of 
Article 9 of the U.C.C., which would not contain such a restriction.176  The 
lower court entered summary judgment in favor of the first purchaser.177 
Finding that the trial court did not err in its application of Article 9, the 
court reasoned that Article 9, in addition to applying to security interests in 
personal property and fixtures, also applied to security interests created by 
contract, including security interests arising by pledge or by assignment.178  
Noting that a security interest is an interest in property that secures payment 
                                                           
170 In re Haase, 224 B.R. at 678.  The group dynamic in this transaction mirrors the traditional 
four-party exchange. 
171 Id. 
172 Western Group Nurseries, Inc. v. Pomeranz, 867 P.2d 12 (Colo. App. 1993).  The court 
also analyzes the parties’ argument regarding collateral estoppel and fraud, which are not 
directly relevant to the U.C.C. question.  Id. at 15–16. 
173 Id. at 13.  The sale took place in two steps, including the purchase of the nursery stock and 
assets by one company, for which a non-recourse note was given, and the sale of assets by the 
first purchaser to a second company, which occurred almost simultaneously.  Id.  This second 
transaction involved a wraparound note.  Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Pomeranz, 867 P.2d at 14. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 15. 
178 Id. at 15. (citing to Colorado’s version of article 9, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-9-102(2) 
(1992 Repl. Vol. 2)). 
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or performance of an obligation, the court held that “the transfer of a note for 
security purposes is governed by Article 9.”179  
Due to the fact that the security agreement for the second sale created a 
security interest in the note given for that sale, and further due to the fact that 
a court in a related case in a different jurisdiction ordered that that note be 
sold at a foreclosure sale, the court held that the trial court’s application of 
Article 9, rather than Article 3, was appropriate.180  The court in Pomeranz 
did not expressly rule that the sale or assignment of a mortgage note creates a 
security interest, in which Article 9 would apply to determinations of the 
right to enforce the note.  However, the reasoning in Pomeranz is similar to 
that employed in Perez, discussed more fully, infra.181 
 
2. New York: Provident Bank v. Community Home Mortgage Corp. 
 
In Provident Bank v. Cmty Home Mortg. Corp.,182 the New York court 
determined priority between banks that each received duplicate original notes 
and assignments of mortgages.  As discussed more fully, infra, applying both 
Articles 3 and 9, the court found in favor of the same party via negotiation 
and the law of secured transactions.183  The lower court case was decided at 
summary judgment.184  Therefore, the court endeavored merely to determine 
whether there was a genuine issue of material fact that precluded judgment 
prior to trial.185 
Defendant mortgage banker had originated residential mortgage loans 
and obtained the money to fund the mortgages by entering into agreements 
with banks, which operated as warehouses until a permanent investor 
purchased the loans, to fund portions of the purchase prices of the loans.186  
The banks alleged that defendant engaged in a scheme whereby its borrowers 
would execute duplicate original promissory notes and mortgage 
assignments.187  After the loans were sold to an investor, only one of the 
banks that operated as a warehouse lender would be fully compensated.188  A 
                                                           
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See Pomeranz, 867 P.2d at 13–16. In a separate, additional related case, the Eleventh 
Circuit applied New York law and made its ruling under the rules of contract interpretation, 
rather than seeking guidance from the U.C.C.  See W. Grp. Nurseries, Inc. v. Ergas, 167 F.3d 
1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1999). 
182 498 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
183 Id. at 575. 
184 Id. at 563–64. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 561–62 (footnote omitted). 
187 Id. at 562.  The court in Provident Bank appears to refer to the original mortgage as a 
“mortgage assignment,” because it is discussing the document signed by the borrowers, rather 
than a document transferring the mortgage between entities with a lien or property interest 
arising out of the mortgage.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
188 Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (citations omitted). 




dispute arose in Provident Bank as to which entity had priority in terms of 
being paid for its purchase of the mortgage.  One bank took possession of the 
original notes and received and recorded assignments of mortgages; another 
bank received the loans first in time, and the notes were specifically endorsed 
to the first in time bank by defendant.189 
The court used Article 9 to reason through the priority dispute.190  
Initially, the court noted that it is clear that an assignment of mortgage 
creates a security interest in the note secured by the mortgage.191  The court 
explained that the lack of clarity regarding “which statutes govern 
mortgages” in New York cause creditors to have difficulty in correctly 
perfecting their security interests in mortgages.192  The court stated that the 
recordation of the assignment of mortgage served as notice under New 
York’s race-notice statute.193  New York follows the rule that “the mortgage 
follows the note.”194  In application of this rule, the court questioned whether 
Article 9 governs perfection of both the note and the mortgage.195  The court 
explained that the unique characteristic of Provident Bank is that there is no 
case law addressing adjudication over duplicate original notes and 
mortgages.196  
Predictably, the bank that recorded its assignments of mortgages first 
argued that the race-notice statute should govern priority.197  The bank that 
took possession of the endorsed notes first argued that Article 9 should 
govern the court’s analysis.198  The court cited a number of cases wherein 
Article 9 was applied in bankruptcy and to non-judicial foreclosure sales.199  
                                                           
189 Id. at 563.  There was one exception to the first-in-time receipt, amongst a total of eight 
notes. Seven of the notes were received by the bank that did not record assignments of the 
mortgages prior to receipt of the duplicate documents by the other bank.  Id. 
190 Id. at 564–66. 
191 Id. at 564 (citation omitted). 
192 Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 564.  Here, the court assumes that there is an Article 9 
interest in the mortgage, which may be perfected, without providing authority demonstrating 
this interest.  Id. 
193 Id.  There are generally three types of statues which determine priority for interests in real 
property: race, notice, and race-notice.  Argent Mortg. Co., LLC v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 52 
So.3d 796, 798–99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).  States may freely adopt the notice of their 
choosing.  Under a race statute, a subsequent mortgagee will prevail against a prior mortgagee 
if the subsequent mortgage is recorded first.  Under a notice statute, a subsequent mortgagee 
who purchased for value and without notice of a prior mortgagee will prevail against the prior 
mortgagee.  Under a race-notice recording statute, a subsequent mortgagee who purchased for 
value and without notice will prevail against the prior mortgagee, if and only if the subsequent 
mortgage is recorded before the prior mortgage.  Id. 
194 Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 564–65 (citation omitted). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 565.  The application of Article 9 in Provident Bank may be limited to cases in which 
there is a dispute over duplicate notes and/or mortgages, but the court does not expressly state 
whether there is such a limitation. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 569–70 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
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The court then held that “pursuant to Article 9, possession of the note 
perfects the assignee’s security interest, under the principle that the mortgage 
follows the note.”200 
Following its discussion of Article 9, the court also applied Article 3.201  
The court held that the notes were negotiated and sufficiently endorsed.202  
Provident Bank does not discuss whether application of Article 9 to the 
assignment of security interests conflicts with Article 3, thereby requiring an 
application of one or the other, but not both.203  Further, Provident Bank does 
not turn on the application of either Article 3 or Article 9 to determine 
standing in an action to foreclose a non-duplicate mortgage.204  Ultimately, 
Provident Bank underscores the difficulty in determining which portions of 
the U.C.C. apply in a particular set of facts. 
 
3. Arizona/Illinois: In re Veal 
 
In In re Veal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 9th Circuit applied 
Illinois state law to questions regarding parties’ standing, in regards to a 
choice of law provision in a relevant mortgage contract.205  A bank, acting as 
trustee for a loan trust, obtained relief from the automatic stay under the 
bankruptcy code, relating to debtors’ property.206  Additionally, an objection 
to debtors’ proof of claim was overruled, in favor of a mortgage loan 
servicer.207  The debtors appealed the relief from the stay and the overruling 
of the objection in a consolidated appeal.208  The issues before the court were 
whether the bank had standing to seek relief from the automatic stay and 
whether the servicer had standing to file the proof of claim.209 
The note was specifically endorsed.210  There was also an assignment of 
mortgage.211  Further, there was an assignment of the note, which the court 
held to be superfluous in light of the specific endorsement.212  The court 
reasoned that it was necessary to determine whether the bank or the servicer 
                                                           
200 Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 570. This statement is curious, because the court does 
not require the Article 9 methods of attachment and perfection, but instead uses Article 9 as a 
stand-in for the analysis under Article 3.  See id. at 571 (citations omitted). 
201 Id. at 572.  The reasoning applies to a party who claims the status of a holder in due course, 
which the subject bank claimed.  Id. 
202 Id. at 573. 
203 See generally Id. (avoiding a discussion of whether application of Article 9 conflicts with 
Article 3). 
204 Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 574–75. 
205 In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897, 916 n.32 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).   




210 Id. at 903. 
211 In re Veal, 450 B.R. at 903.   
212 Id. at 904 n.6. 




had standing, generally, and also whether they had prudential standing, to be 
able to access the federal courts.213 
The court noted that the U.C.C. embraces instances in which the person 
who owns the note is not the person entitled to enforce the obligation to pay 
thereunder.214  This fact lends credence to the notion that “the rules that 
determine who is entitled to enforce a note are concerned primarily with the 
maker of the note” and who they must pay to avoid default—as opposed to 
the rules concerning transfer of ownership and other interests in the note, 
which are concerned with who, “among competing claimants,” is entitled to 
the value of the note.215  This distinction is important for the court, because it 
allows the court to distinguish Article 9 ownership rights in the note from the 
Article 3 right to enforce the note, with the attendant right to foreclose the 
mortgage.216  However, the court notes that, if a payee seeks to use the note 
as collateral or sell the note to a third party “in a manner not within Article 
3,” Article 9 would govern the transaction and determine whether a property 
interest in the note is obtained.217  Ultimately, the court holds that the parties 
seeking the value of the note could prove entitlement to same by 
demonstrating that they were a person entitled to enforce the note under 
Article 3, but that one party could also alternatively demonstrate that it had 
some ownership or other property interest in the note.218 
 
4. Florida 
a. GE Credit Corp. v. Air Flow Indus. 
 
GE Credit Corp. v. Air Flow Indus., Inc. involved the aftermath of a 
foreclosure action relating to a mortgage given for the construction of a 
pool.219  The foreclosure was based on an ineffective mortgage, which 
described a parcel of land that did not exist.220  Thereafter, plaintiff brought 
an action against the company that had assigned the mortgage to plaintiff, as 
well as the company’s principals who had individually guaranteed the 
mortgage.221 
The Florida court considered whether the U.C.C. governs “the legal 
consequences of the assignment of a real estate mortgage,” and concluded 
                                                           
213 Id. at 906.  Prudential standing is not a relevant fact in determining whether a party may 
enforce a note or foreclose a mortgage in a typical foreclosure matter.  Id. at 907 (footnotes 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
214 Id. at 912 (footnote omitted). 
215 Id. 
216 In re Veal, 450 B.R. at 912. 
217 Id. at 913 (footnote omitted). 
218 Id. at 912 (footnotes omitted). 
219 GE Credit Corp. v. Air Flow Indus., Inc., 432 So. 2d 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1983). 
220 Id. at 608.  The court calls the mortgage an “ineffective instrument,” though it is likely that 
the note was the instrument, rather than the mortgage. 
221 Id. 
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that it did not.222  The court found that Articles 2, 3, and 9 were each 
inapplicable to the assignment.223  With regard to its analysis under Article 3, 
the court cites a single section of the Florida Statutes, which no longer 
exists.224  However, the application of Article 3 to the legal consequences of 
an assignment of mortgage is irrelevant, because Article 3 nevertheless 
covers negotiable instruments, such as the note that provides the underlying 
debt that the assigned mortgage would secure.225  
The court’s holding regarding Article 9 is most significant.  For support, 
the court cites to Rucker v. State Exchange Bank,226 which held that “the 
assignment of a real estate mortgage securing a promissory note as collateral 
for a bank loan is not a secured transaction under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code because it is specifically excluded by Section 
679.104(10).”227  However, as will be discussed, infra, the applicability of 
this holding in Rucker has been undercut by subsequent legislation, which is 
potentially only material to the question of whether recordation of an 
assignment of mortgage is necessary.228 
 
b. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez 
 
In HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez, two banks took possession of similar 
mortgage promissory notes, which were both secured by the same mortgage, 
and each disputed that the other did not have the right to foreclose the single 
mortgage.229  The Florida circuit court applied portions of Chapter 701, 
Florida Statutes, which governs the assignment and cancellation of 
mortgages.230  The appellate court concluded that “the Uniform Commercial 
Code, and not the recording statute, controls this case.”231  However, the 
court did not look to Chapter 673 of the Florida Statutes, which governs 
negotiability.  Instead, the court reasoned that “[u]nder the Code, the bank 
                                                           
222 Id. at n.5. 
223 Id. 
224 See id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 673.104 (1981)). 
225 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1041 (West 1994). 
226 355 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
227 Id. at 175.  The court in Perez, infra, analyzes this language in Rucker and explains that 
Chapter 679 was reformed to clear up any misconceptions and provide that an assignment of a 
security interest is a secured transaction, for the purpose of not requiring the cost of 
recordation of assignments of mortgage.  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez, 165 So. 3d 696, 
707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
228 Perez, 165 So. 3d at 707. 
229 Id. at 698. 
230 Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 701. 
231 Perez, 165 So. 3d at 698.  The recording statute referenced is FLA. STAT. ANN. § 701.02, 
which governs the recordation of assignments of mortgages.  Florida has a separate recording 
statute, generally, at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 695.01. 




that first perfected its interest in a note and related mortgage is entitled to the 
priority of its interest.”232 
Florida’s enactment of Article 9 is contained in Chapter 679 of the 
Florida Statutes.233  The court in Perez noted that “[g]enerally, Chapter 679 
does not apply ‘to the creation of’ a real property mortgage.’”234  However, 
this concession was meant to set up an exception that may apply to most, if 
not all, of foreclosure cases in the state.  The court goes on to state “if . . . the 
note in a mortgage transaction is sold or assigned, Chapter 679 applies to the 
security interest created in favor of the purchaser or assignee of the note.”235  
This exception is expansive because, as discussed, supra, most mortgage 
promissory notes are sold or assigned, at some point.  
The court cites the following Official Comment in support of its 
reasoning:  
 
O borrows $10,000 from M and secures its repayment 
obligation, evidenced by a promissory note, by granting to M 
a mortgage on O’s land. [Article 9] does not apply to the 
creation of the real-property mortgage. However, if M sells 
the promissory note to X or gives a security interest in the 
note to secure M’s own obligation to X, [Article 9] applies to 
the security interest thereby created in favor of X. The 
security interest in the promissory note is covered by [Article 
9] even though the note is secured by a real-property 
mortgage.236 
                                                           
232 Perez, 165 So. 3d at 698. 
233 Id. at 699. 
234 Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1091). 
235 Id.  The opinion in Perez, to the extent that it appears to provide space for standing to be 
established under Article 9 precepts, appears to conflict with recently-enacted Florida law, 
which requires complaints to plead standing to foreclose pursuant to Article 3.  Specifically, 
section 702.015, Florida Statutes and rule 1.115, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, each 
require a plaintiff in a foreclosure action to track the language of Article 3. 
236 Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1091, cmt. 7).  The court here neglects to reference the 
following paragraph in the Comment, which states that “an attempt to obtain or perfect a 
security interest in a secured obligation by complying with non-article 9 law, as by an 
assignment of record of a real properly mortgage, would be ineffective,” though this section is 
discussed elsewhere in the opinion to arrive at a determination that the mortgage assignment 
recording statute is irrelevant to a determination under Article 9.  See id. at 707–08.  That said, 
it is disputable whether the status of the parties needs to be determined by a resort to Article 9, 
in the first place, and the court does not address this question.  See id.; see also Am. Bank S. v. 
Rothenberg, 598 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reasoning, before the 1998 
amendments to Article 9, that “the promissory note meets the requirements of section 673.104, 
Florida Statutes (1991) and is thus a negotiable instrument” and determining priority based on 
Florida’s statutory scheme adopting Article 3 of the Code).  In fact, the court in Rothenberg 
held that “the rights of the parties must be determined by the character of the promissory 
note,” and not by the potential attachment or perfection of any interests in same.  Rothenberg, 
598 So. 2d at 291; see also Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Haynes & Co., 893 F. Supp. 1304, 
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The mortgage in Perez was in favor of Federal Guaranty Mortgage 
Company.237  HSBC obtained physical possession of one of the notes when it 
closed on a pooling and servicing agreement.238  Subsequent to HSBC’s 
purchase, the second bank entered into a separate pooling and servicing 
agreement and took possession of the second note.239  The court held that, 
“[o]nce HSBC took possession of the note it had an Article 9 security interest 
in the note,” which attached.240  The perfecting of the security interest in the 
note resulted in a perfection of the security interest in the mortgage, as 
well.241 
In an attempt to make the decision seem consistent with prior precedent 
on the subject, the court reasoned that the facts in the dispute are consistent 
with “the notion that the promissory note, not the mortgage, is the operative 
instrument in a mortgage loan transaction, since a mortgage is but an incident 
to the debt, the payment of which it secures, and its ownership follows the 
assignment of the debt.”242  However, immediately following this 
pronouncement of consistency, the court then discussed how a security 
interest attaches to collateral,243 and restated a stricter requirement than that 
for Article 3 negotiation: attachment occurs “when (a) value has been given, 
(b) the assignor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in 
the collateral to a secured party, and (c) the assignor has authenticated a 
security agreement that provides a description of the collateral or the 
assignee has taken possession of the note under section 679.3131.”244 
                                                                                                                                           
passim (D.S.C. 1994) (applying Article 3 to a dispute between two defrauded, innocent 
parties, and expressly rejecting application of Article 9).  
237 Perez, 165 So. 3d at 698. 
238 Id.  A pooling and servicing agreement relates to the securitization of mortgage loans and is 
a typical document in transactions between lending institutions and mortgage servicers.  These 
agreements tend to be rigid mechanisms to govern “the management of securitized mortgage 
loan pools.”  Anna Gelpern and Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout 
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1077 
(describing a pooling and servicing agreement as being designed to “preclude or severely 
constrain the modification of both the securitization arrangement and the underlying 
mortgages”). 
239 Perez, 165 So. 3d at 698. 
240 Id. at 699. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. (internal citations omitted).  The court cites WM Specialty Mortg., LLC v. Salomon, 
874 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which quotes Johns v. Gillian, 184 So. 140, 
143 (Fla. 1938).  Both Salomon and Gillian involve a set of facts in which a mortgage was 
assigned.  However, as discussed, supra, such an assignment would be insufficient under 
Article 9. 
243 Perez, 165 So. 2d at 699–700.  Pursuant to Article 9, a party may not foreclose unless the 
security interest has attached to the collateral.  JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-1, at 1185 (6th ed. 2010). 
244 Perez, 165 So. 3d at 699–700 (internal. quotations omitted).  See also FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 679.2031; U.C.C. § 9-203.  Note the difference between the requirement of value, the right 
to transfer, and either a formal agreement with specific information or physical possession and 
 




The Perez court discusses the idea of perfection of a security interest in 
negotiable notes, as opposed to attachment of the security interest to the note, 
by stating that “[o]ne method of perfecting a security interest in a promissory 
note is by taking possession of the original promissory note.”245  It is argued 
that perfection functions as public notice, because the collateral is not left in 
the hands of the debtor.246  However, perfection is not required for the 
prosecution of a foreclosure case.247 
Following its discussion of the applicability of the doctrines of 
attachment and perfection, the court reasoned that HSBC, and not the 
subsequent possessor of the second note, had priority, as determined under 
Article 9 and Florida’s legislation in furtherance thereof.248  The priority 
determination is less pertinent to this discussion than is the fact that Article 9 
was utilized to make the determination.  The Perez court notes that, in a prior 
case,249 the court concluded that the assignment of mortgage recording statute 
had no application to a determination of priority, much like the court’s ruling 
in Perez.250  Unlike in Perez, the court in the prior case “applied Chapter 673 
of Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code to hold American Bank’s interest 
superior to Rothenberg’s by virtue of its status as possessor of a valid 
assignment of mortgage and holder in due course of the original note.”251  
The court further cited a case which “held that ‘the assignment of a real 
estate mortgage securing a promissory note as collateral for a bank loan is 
not a secured transaction under Article 9’ of the UCC.”252  Although the case 
had been supplanted by legislation meant to demonstrate that an assignment 
                                                                                                                                           
the requirement that a person be in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either 
to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession. 
245 Perez, 165 So. 3d at 700 (citing FLA. STAT. § 679.3131(1) (2008)).  Perfection determines 
matters of priority and provides third parties with notice of the transaction.  See id. 
246 Id.; see also David A. Ebroon, Note, Perfection by Possession in Article 9: Challenging the 
Arcane but Honored Rule, 69 IND. L.J. 1193, 1194 (1994). 
247 See id.  The court in Perez cites to the Report of the Permanent Editorial Board for the 
Uniform Commercial Code, cited herein supra note 1.  The Report distinguishes between an 
enforcement interest in an instrument and its security interest on the one hand and an 
entitlement to the economic value of the instrument or security interest, on the other hand.  See 
Report of the Editorial Board, supra note 1, at 339.  There being two separate possible 
interests: one of entitlement to enforce an instrument and another of entitlement to the 
economic value of the instrument, application of Article 9 to sold or transferred mortgage 
promissory notes is of no moment, because the rules therein apply only “among competing 
claimants,” which is wholly within the world of the mortgagee.  See id.  In the world of the 
mortgagor, questions of who the mortgagor is required to pay and who may enforce the loan 
documents are resolved under Article 3.  See id. at 345.  However, this is not clarified in 
Perez, and appears not to be recognized by other jurisdictions, as discussed, herein. 
248 Perez, 165 So. 3d at 708. 
249 Rothenberg, 598 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
250 Perez, 165 So. 3d at 702–04. 
251 Id. at 704 (internal quotations omitted). 
252 Id. at 707 (quoting Rucker v. State Exchange Bank, 355 So. 2d 171, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1978)). 
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of a security interest in a mortgage is a secured transaction,253 the court does 
not respond to the established precedent that the character of the note is what 
matters, rather than the perfection of any interest in the note.254  It may be 
that the Perez court intended for Article 9 to apply to disputes between 
lenders, while leaving Article 3 for resolution of disputes between a lender 
and borrowers, but this is not explicitly stated. It may also be that the court’s 
reasoning means standing in a garden variety foreclosure case will be 
decided by use of Article 9, if there was ever a sale or transfer of the loan. 
 
V. THE PREFERENCE OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
ARTICLE 3 ENFORCEMENT OF MORTGAGE PROMISSORY NOTES TO 
ENFORCEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 9 
 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, there are two avenues to 
establish a lender’s standing to enforce a mortgage promissory note: a lender 
may either travel under Article 3 or may attempt to travel under Article 9.255 
Article 3 governs negotiable instruments, whereas Article 9 governs secured 
transactions.256  Applied to the arena of foreclosures, Article 9 serves to 
replicate many of the fundamental errors that arose during the fashioning of 
foreclosure jurisprudence, including uncertainty in terminology, disharmony 
amongst jurisdictions, and a tendency toward the harsh end of strict 
foreclosure.  Article 3, on the other hand, represents a solution to many of the 
problems made manifest under Article 9. 
 
A. Article 9: Definitional Uncertainty, Non-Uniformity, and a Trend 
Toward Strict Foreclosure 
 
Article 9 is divided into five main components: “scope, attachment, 
perfection, priorities, and enforcement.”257  Scope and attachment are the 
critical components for the purpose of this article; those components control 
whether Article 9 applies in the context of an action to foreclose a mortgage 
and whether Article 9 would be preferable to the traditional methodology 
under Article 3. 
The scope of Article 9 reaches a security interest arising under other 
sections of the U.C.C.258  However, the security interests covered under 
Article 9 on this point generally relate to interests arising under Articles 2, 4, 
                                                           
253 Id. (quoting FLA. S. JUSTICE APPROP. COMM., S.B. 370 (2005), Staff Analysis 7–8 (Apr. 4, 
2005)). 
254 Id.  
255 See Report of the Editorial Board, supra note 1, at 333–34.  
256 Id. at 333. 
257 Keith G. Meyer, A Potpourri of Article 9 Issues, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 323, 323 (Summer 
2003) (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-108, 9-109, 9-203, 9-204, 9-315(a) (2000)). 
258 Id. at 324 n. 252 (citing U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(5)); see also U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(6). 




and 5, and do not include reference to any Article 3 interests.259  Article 9 
also applies to promissory notes.260  The section defining scope does not 
include mortgages.261  Article 9 has been applied to mortgage foreclosure 
cases, where the property is used for the production of agricultural crops.262  
Notwithstanding this application, there are specific portions of the U.C.C. 
dedicated to security interests in crops,263 and agricultural interests under 
Article 9 are governed specifically and directly.264 
Sections 9-109(c) and (d) set for enumerated transactions that are exempt 
from application of Article 9.  One exemption is for an assignment of 
“accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes which 
[are] for the purpose of collection only.”265  Additionally, with exceptions, 
the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property is exempt.266  
Article 9 does not apply to a pure real estate transaction.267  However, 
when Article 9 was revised in 2002, the definition of “account” was 
broadened “to include the right to payment of a monetary obligation for 
property that has been . . . sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise 
disposed of.”268  Therefore, the obligation to make payments under an 
installment contract for the sale of real property is an account, now.269  
Article 9 applies to the sale of accounts.270 
Initially, enforcement under Article 9 is vague and uncertain because 
Article 9 relies on a theory of “commercial reasonableness,” which is flexible 
in ways much like the “reasonable period” afforded under the equity of 
redemption.271  Commercial reasonableness stands for the proposition that 
parties are to act in good faith and conduct themselves with fair dealing in 
coming to a determination as to reasonable value.272  There is no bright-line 
test to determine whether a particular result is commercially reasonable, and 
nor is there an articulated method for specifying the parameters of 
                                                           
259 U.C.C. §§ 9-109(a)(5), (6). 
260 U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3). 
261 See U.C.C. § 9-109(a). 
262 Meyer, supra note 257, at 326. 
263 Id.; see also U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(44)(iv); 9-302, 9-308, 9-310, 9-317, 9-322, 9-338, 9-606. 
264 See U.C.C. § 9-302, providing specifically for the jurisdictional parameters of perfection 
and priority of agricultural liens; see also Moritz Implement Co. v. Matthews, 959 P.2d 886 
(Kan. 1998), discussed by Meyer as holding “that Article 9 is the exclusive statutory scheme 
governing security interests in growing crops” and that attachment of such liens is independent 
of the occurrence of a foreclosure sale of the property.  Meyer, supra note 257, at 326 n.14. 
265 U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(5). 
266 U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(11). 
267 Meyer, supra note 257, at 327. 
268 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (citing U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(i)). 
269 Meyer, supra note 257, at 328. 
270 U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3). 
271 See Donald J. Rapson, Default and Enforcement of Security Interests under Revised Article 
9, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 893, 893, 907 (1999). 
272 See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20). 
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commercial reasonableness.273  Moreover, commercial reasonability may 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, furthering confusion as to what is or 
may be commercially reasonable in a particular set of circumstances.274  
Contributing to the unpredictable air surrounding commercial reasonableness 
under Article 9 is the fact that, while Article 9 provides the right to foreclose, 
it never defines the word “foreclose.”275 
Furthermore, Article 9 fails to promote sufficient uniformity in real 
estate law.276  A secured party who exercises rights under Article 9, with 
respect to personal property, is not prejudiced as to any rights under real 
estate law.277  However, revised Article 9, as applied in a one-form-of-action 
pleading state, may cause the secured party to lose the right to proceed 
against personalty where such a secured party first engages in an action to 
judicially enforce a mortgage.278 
Perhaps most importantly, Article 9 provides for the harsh remedy of 
strict foreclosure.  Revised Article 9 encourages strict foreclosure in at least 
five separate ways: (1) the secured party may elect to accept collateral in 
satisfaction of a debt if the secured party does not receive an objection within 
20 days; (2) in certain circumstances, the secured party may accept collateral 
in partial satisfaction of a debt; (3) the secured party may strictly foreclose 
intangible collateral; (4) the secured party may accept collateral and use such 
acceptance as a discharge of junior claimants, without the junior claimants 
having the equitable due process rights to seek surplus proceeds; and (5) the 
secured party may hold collateral for an undefined, indefinite, uncertain 
period of time and still seek a deficiency.279  The acerbity of Article 9 is only 
furthered by the fact that, in conjunction with allowing a party to proceed by 
                                                           
273 John P. McCahey, Commercial Reasonableness in the Disposition of Collateral: Proceed 
with Care, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL & BUSINESS LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION (Summer 2002) (providing that “the particular facts and circumstances of each 
disposition will determine whether or not it was commercially reasonable”). 
274 Id.  Compare the inscrutable, unwieldy process in Article 9 with revised Article 8.  Article 
8 was revised in a manner that represents “a bold and long overdue advance that facilitates the 
day-to-day transfer and registration of securities in the country’s active securities markets.”  
Richard A. Hakes, UCC Article 8: Will the Indirect Holding of Securities Survive the Light of 
Day?, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 661, 664 (2002).  The revisions to Article 8 had an intended goal 
of simplifying, rather than complicating the rules concerning the purview of Article 8.  See id. 
at 671. 
275 Rapson, supra note 271 at 907 (calling Article 9’s treatment of foreclosure “loose and 
informal”); see also U.C.C. § 9-601(a)(1). 
276 U.C.C. § 9-604(a).  
277 Barkley Clark, Revised Article 9 of the UCC: Scope, Perfection, Priorities, and Default, 4 
N.C. BANKING INST. 129, 171–72 (2000).  A state with one form of action is a state that 
utilizes a single procedural vehicle for attempting to enforce or protect private rights. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 178–80; see also U.C.C. §§ 9-620, 9-621, 9-622.  




judicial process, it also permits a secured party to take possession of 
collateral without judicial process.280 
 
B. The Benefits of Enforcement under Article 3 
 
In contrast to the problematic scheme contemplated in Article 9,281 
Article 3, revised in 2002 and adopted by a number of states,282 avoids the 
problems of the past.  Negotiability under Article 3, as the traditional 
enforcement mechanism for mortgage promissory notes, fosters 
predictability and uniformity amongst jurisdictions.283  Article 3 requires 
physical possession of the note, unless the note has been lost or destroyed.284  
The physical possession requirement protects borrowers in the face of 
potentially dishonest lenders.285  The protection provided by Article 3 is 
balanced by the ability, under Section 3-309 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, to enforce an instrument not in possession of the lender where 
ownership can be proven, even if the purchaser and the seller were never in 
possession of the note.286 
Under Article 3, proof of the ability to enforce an instrument is a 
mandatory element that addresses concerns that borrowers would otherwise 
be vulnerable to having to satisfy obligations more than once, because a 
holder in due course could acquire possession of the note after a person not 
in possession had already sought to enforce the note.287  Due to the fact that 
most other states had already adopted the 2002 revisions to Article 3 by 
2004, nationwide adoption and use of Revised Article 3 promotes further 
                                                           
280 U.C.C. §§ 9-609(b)(1), (2).  Presumably, the only limitation on the ability of a secured 
party to take possession of collateral or remove, render useless, or dispose of collateral on a 
debtor’s premises is that the secured party is required to do so “without breach of the peace.”  
U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2). 
281 In addition to the problems discussed, supra, resort to enforcement by way of Article 9 
restricts the free flow of negotiable paper, notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage servicing 
industry has normalized negotiation as a means to transfer mortgage promissory notes. Such a 
move should be rejected in favor of the free circulation of promissory notes.  See Jack J. 
Fisher, The Effect of Fluctuating Rates of Interest on the Negotiability of an Instrument, 23 
WASH. U.L.Q. 385, 391–92, 398 (1938). 
282 Natalya Ter-Grigoryan, Improving the Law of Negotiable Instruments: Support for 
Arizona’s Adoption of the 2002 Proposed Revisions to Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-
309, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1331, passim (Winter 2010/2011). 
283 White, supra note 3, at 472–73 (stating that Article 3 is utilized as the traditional, assumed 
approach for enforcement, while parties and courts are presently simultaneously opposing the 
injection of Article 9 enforcement); see also Nyquist, supra note 57, at 898–99. 
284 U.C.C. §§ 3-201, 3-309. 
285 Ter-Grigoryan, supra note 282, at 1334–35. 
286 U.C.C. § 3-309; see also Ter-Grigoryan, supra note 282, at 1345 (discussing Florida’s 
adoption of the 2002 revisions to Section 3-309). 
287 SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 282 (Fla. 2004), 
http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2004/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2004s0282.cm.pdf 
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uniformity.288  Likewise, Revised Article 3 allows for electronic maintenance 
of real estate finance documents, making it easier for parties to trace the 
chain of a promissory note.289  Enforcement under Article 3 therefore 
protects consumers, guards against secret liens, and encourages transactions 
to function through an open, increasingly transparent, and ordinary course.290  
The question, then, is whether mortgage notes are negotiable, and thus 
entitled to Article 3 enforcement. 
Resorting to enforcement by way of Article 9 restricts the free flow of 
negotiable paper, notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage servicing 
industry has normalized negotiation as a means to transfer mortgage 
promissory notes.  Such a move should be rejected in favor of the free 




The historical developments of negotiability and foreclosure law, along 
with the present foreclosure backlog, point toward the fact that negotiability 
provides a predictable framework in an otherwise chaotic mess.  A mortgage 
promissory note is a negotiable instrument, which entitles a plaintiff lender to 
claim status as the holder of the negotiable instrument.  As the holder of the 
negotiable instrument, the plaintiff lender gains the incidental right to enforce 
any mortgage related to the note.  This formula is nearly universal and has 
existed since before the Great Depression ushered forth the last foreclosure 
backlog.  Recent attempts to privilege Article 9 over Article 3 will not result 
in better outcomes in foreclosure cases, but will instead replicate the errors 
seen throughout the history of the law relating to foreclosure. 
 
                                                           
288 See id.; Ter-Grigoryan, supra note 282, at 1346. 
289 Ter-Grigoryan, supra note 282, at 1348. 
290Nyquist, supra note 57, at 902. 
